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INTRODUCTION 
 
  As noted by Mintzberg (1979), the operation of a business firm gives rise to both 
cooperation and conflict.  Conflicts can arise between owners and managers in the division of the 
value created by the firm as well as amongst managers in the struggle for power and control 
rights within the firm.  We focus on the latter conflict in this paper, using the multinational 
corporation (MNC) as the subject organizational form.  In the literature, this conflict has been 
analyzed within two quite disparate perspectives, namely agency theory and resource 
dependency theory. 
Within the agency perspective, conflict amongst managers has been framed as one where 
managers at headquarters are linked in an agency relationship with managers in operating 
divisions (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  It is recognized that MNC subsidiaries pursue their 
own interests and are not a mechanical instruments of headquarters’ will.  More importantly, ‘the 
local interests of the subsidiaries may not always be aligned with those of the headquarters or the 
MNC as a whole’ (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994, p.492).  However, while the agency perspective 
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incorporates autonomous decision-making by subsidiary managers, their decision-making 
autonomy may be categorized as discretion in the sense of Williamson (1996).  The subsidiary 
has ‘delegated decision rights (that) are always “loaned, not owned”’ (Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy, 2002; Foss, Foss and Vazquez, 2006).  Headquarters retains the power of veto, i.e., the 
ability to overrule any subsidiary decision. 
In contrast, the analysis of power in the management literature has been based on the 
basic notion that ‘power is the ability to get others to do something that they would not otherwise 
do’ (Dahl, 1957) and that the successful exercise of power requires that it be based on a set of 
‘legitimating principles’ that are specific to the organization (Weber, 1968).  This is the basis of 
resource dependency theory that posits that power is based on the control of resources that are 
considered strategic within the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977a) and is often expressed 
in terms of budgets and resource allocations (Pfeffer and Moore, 1980; Mudambi and Navarra, 
2004). 
The game theoretic concept that is closest to the notion of power emerges from resource 
dependency theory is bargaining power (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).  This is the extent to 
which players can influence the division of contested resources.  Subsidiary autonomy based on 
bargaining power is fundamentally different from discretion in the sense that it is much more 
difficult for headquarters to revoke.  In other words, subsidiaries with strong bargaining power 
have a degree of ‘ownership’ over their decision rights rather than holding them at the pleasure 
of headquarters. 
Resource dependency theory is externally focused in the sense that ‘power is held by 
divisions that are the most important for coping with and solving the critical problems of the 
organization that arise from its environment’ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977a).  Organizational 
 2
survival in a competitive environment provides a logical basis for this position, since 
organizations that fail address their critical problems will disappear.  However, while the 
theoretical basis for this position is convincing, empirical testing has been relatively limited.  
Such work as exists has focused on case study data (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and data drawn 
from the non-profit sector like universities (Pfeffer and Moore, 1980) and hospitals (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1977b). 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that agency theory and resource 
dependency theory are two pillars upon which to understand decision-making by managers in 
MNC subsidiaries.  We develop an over-arching theory that encompasses both agency theory and 
resource dependency theory.  We propose that agency theory applies when the subsidiary’s 
decision rights are ‘loaned’ by headquarters, while resource dependency theory applies when the 
subsidiary ‘owns’ its decision rights.  Agency theory is more applicable to the hierarchical model 
of MNC where subsidiaries mainly exploit competencies developed by their parents.  However, 
modern MNCs are increasingly viewed as differentiated networks (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994), 
where some subsidiaries continue to function the traditional competence exploiting role while 
other are competence creating and augment the advantages of their home-base (Cantwell and 
Mudambi, 2005).  Resource dependency theory provides a better basis upon which to understand 
the relationships between competence creating subsidiaries and their parent MNCs.  Thus, within 
the differentiated MNC network, both agency theory and resource dependency theory are 
required to understand the full range of headquarter-subsidiary relationships. 
Subsidiaries with strong power can resist headquarters attempts to control their resources 
in the MNC’s internal capital market (Mudambi, 1999; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004).  This 
theory implies that subsidiary responsibilities are as much the result of subsidiary power arising 
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from resource dependency as of headquarters’ design based on agency theory.  The development 
and consolidation of such power at the subsidiary level is facilitated by the ‘loose coupling’ 
promoted by the network structure of many modern MNCs (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1991).  
An important point that arises in this context concerns the legal status of the subsidiary 
within the MNC.  How can a subsidiary have bargaining power when it is not an independent 
legal entity and therefore has no legally defensible property rights?  The legal status of a 
subsidiary implies that it has not ownership rights over its tangible assets and its control over 
such assets can only be in the form of discretion – headquarters can always re-take control of 
such assets.  However, the MNC parent’s ownership rights do not always and automatically 
translate into defensible property rights (Foss and Foss, 2005).  A subsidiary’s bargaining power 
will generally be based on assets over which property rights are hard to define and enforce.  The 
bulk of such assets are in the form of intangible assets like knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). 
Agency theory has been extensively tested in the context of MNC subsidiaries.  However, 
resource dependency theory has not received much attention in the international business 
literature.  As subsidiaries increasingly evolve towards higher levels of competence creation, we 
argue that resource dependency theory becomes increasingly relevant to developing an 
understanding of decision making in MNC subsidiaries.  Hence, in this study, we propose to test 
resource dependency theory in the context of MNCs. 
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
In the international business literature, the most widely used theory to explain the 
operations of the multinational enterprise (MNC) is transaction costs economics (TCE) 
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pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975).  In the classic analysis of Buckley and 
Casson (1976), the MNC arises by internalizing transactions across national borders whenever 
the costs of intra-firm operations (hierarchy) are lower than the costs of inter-firm transactions 
(markets).  The establishment of hierarchy creates a principal-agent relationship within the firm.  
The organization of the MNC, however, is a special form of hierarchy in which the principal and 
the agent operate in different national environments, so that success requires the ability to cope 
with institutional differences and idiosyncrasies (Henisz, 2003). 
 
The Agency Perspective 
Agency theory is one of the most widely used theories to explain the organization of 
relationships within MNCs (O’Donnell, 2000).  As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976),  
‘the problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” 
welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations, and in all cooperative efforts — at 
every level of management in firms’ (p.309). 
 
Within the MNC, headquarters (as principal) delegates decision-making responsibilities to the 
subsidiary (the agent).  Agency problems arise in this relationship whenever the subsidiary’s own 
interests are incongruent with those of headquarters.  In other words, the subsidiary will act to 
pursue its own interests, even when these diverge from those of the firm as a whole.  Monitoring 
is the most commonly recommended solution to the agency problem, with the level of 
monitoring dictated by the extent of divergence of interests between principal and agent (the 
severity of the agency problem).  In the context of headquarters-subsidiary relations, it has been 
reported that more severe agency problems are controlled by increased headquarters control 
(Chang and Taylor, 1999). 
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 MNCs are multi-unit firms and in this context, the agency approach has been best 
developed in the literature on internal capital markets.  This literature models the headquarters of 
multi-divisional enterprises re-distributing resources from laggard to leading constituent units 
(Stein, 1997).  The units of the firm (e.g., subsidiaries) then have an incentive to selectively 
provide information to headquarters in order to maximize their resource allocations.  The 
literature documents intra-firm resource transfers within multi-unit firms that are not linked to 
unit investment opportunities (Lamont, 1997).  It further documents that such inter-unit transfers 
increase as the level of firm diversification rises (Shin and Stulz, 1998).  It explains this 
inefficiency as stemming from the agency relationship between unit (e.g., subsidiary) managers 
and headquarters.   
Several models based on agency theory have been developed to explain resource transfers 
by headquarters to constituent units whose current financial performance is poor.  Some 
conclude that such transfers are inefficient and value destroying.  They have been modeled as 
bribes to managers of weak units to induce them to cooperate with the firm’s stronger units 
(Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000) or as stemming from the fact that managers of poorly 
performing units have a lower opportunity cost of engaging in non-productive bargaining 
activities with headquarters (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  Others conclude that such transfers 
are representations of unobserved value creation and are a means of promoting long run firm 
efficiency.  Thus, Rotemberg (1993) suggests that managers who provide critical services to the 
firm may be housed and networked within poorly performing units.  Transfers are a means 
whereby headquarters can make irreversible commitments to such managers.  Matsusaka (2001) 
suggests that internal resource flows to poorly performing units (or subsidiaries) are a means of 
developing new businesses as the firm searches for new avenues to exploit its organizational 
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capabilities.  In this view, internal capital markets are an optimal response to the industry life 
cycle. 
 
Subsidiary evolution 
Historically, MNCs used their subsidiaries abroad mainly for the purposes of the 
adaptation of products developed in their home countries to local tastes or customer needs, and 
the adaptation of processes to local resource availabilities and production conditions.  In this 
situation subsidiaries were dependent on the competence of their parent companies, and so their 
role was essentially just 'home-base exploiting' (Kuemmerle, 1999).  In recent years instead, 
linked to the closer integration of subsidiaries into international networks within the MNC, some 
subsidiary operations have gained a more creative role, e.g., to generate new technology in 
accordance with the comparative advantage in innovation of the country in which the subsidiary 
is located (Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Pearce, 1999; Zander, 1999).  This transformation has led 
to subsidiaries becoming functionally much more independent.  
This independence has been expressed in several different ways, e.g., assembly-type 
versus research-related production facilities, market-seeking versus asset-seeking FDI (Dunning, 
1993), home-based exploiting versus home-base augmenting FDI (Kuemmerle, 1999), national 
mandates versus center of excellence mandates (Holm and Pedersen, 2000) and so on.  All of 
these typologies point to the fact that, over the past two decades or so, subsidiaries have been 
evolving out of their traditional role of being the subservient executors of headquarters 
commands.  This process has been called ‘subsidiary evolution’ (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
The shift towards internationally integrated strategies within MNCs is partly grounded on 
a ‘life cycle’ effect within what have become mature MNCs, which have now created a sufficient 
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international spread in their operations that they have the facility to establish an internal network 
of specialized subsidiaries.  Each subsidiary evolves a specific regional or global contribution to 
the MNC beyond the concerns of its own most immediate market (Cantwell and Piscitello, 
2005).  Thus, subsidiaries that began as local market-oriented (import-substituting) units are 
gradually transformed into competence-creating units that are internationally integrated 
(Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). 
 Mature, competence-creating subsidiaries are able to tap into local competencies and 
these can become a valuable source of competitive advantage for the parent MNC.  Thus, the key 
aspect of Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) transnational solution is the mobilization of 
competencies developed by the MNC’s network of subsidiaries.  The extent of the subsidiary’s 
local embeddedness is a crucial component of knowledge inflows and learning from the host 
country system of innovation (Frost, 2001).  Local embeddedness emerges as one of the most 
important resources in the development of subsidiary competencies (Forsgren, Holm and 
Johansen, 1995; Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 2002).  The development of subsidiary 
competencies then becomes part of ‘subsidiary specific advantage’ (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001) 
and has been found to depend on subsidiary initiative (Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonsson, 1998).  
 
The Resource Dependency Perspective 
 As a subsidiary evolves, the scope of its decision-making increases and the agency 
perspective on its relationship with headquarters becomes undermined along two dimensions.  
This is because the firm structure underpinning the agency perspective is the hierarchy, i.e., a 
hierarchical relationship between headquarters and subsidiary level managers.  First, hierarchy is 
no longer the appropriate structure to analyze MNC networks including highly evolved 
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subsidiaries.  There is considerable evidence now supporting the position that such MNCs 
function more like networks than hierarchies. 
‘The network model of the MNC, in contrast the product life cycle model … allows the 
subsidiary to move from a position of subordination (vis’-a’vis’ head office) to one of 
equality or even of leadership’  (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998: p.778). 
 
Second, the subsidiary and headquarter units rather than individuals are more appropriate 
as the unit of analysis.  This suggests that the Carnegie School tradition of organization theory 
that is formulated at the organizational rather than the individual level may be more appropriate  
(March and Simon, 1958).  In this view, firms are shifting political coalitions and it is 
organizational politics rather than efficiency considerations that drive decision-making.  The 
focus of organizational politics is power.  This approach is operationalized in resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Resource dependency theory suggests that units are differentially valuable in dealing with 
crises emanating from its external environment.  Units that control resources that are strategic in 
terms of managing critical relationships between the firm and its environment achieve power 
within the organization.  Therefore the firm depends disproportionately for its survival and/or 
success on units that control strategic resources.  The MNC is a dispersed firm in which 
subsidiaries control unique and non-substitutable resources.  It follows that resource dependency 
theory predicts that subsidiaries controlling resources used throughout the firm to manage 
strategic processes will be able to exert the strongest influence on corporate decision-making.   
The process of subsidiary evolution is one of internal competition within the MNC 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).  Some subsidiaries evolve to obtain greater responsibility and 
control over strategic decision making, while others find their roles curtailed or even eliminated.  
A natural implication of subsidiary evolution is a considerable amount of variation in control 
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patterns within the population of subsidiaries of a given MNC firm.  Resource dependency 
theory provides a basis to understand this assortment of headquarters-subsidiary and subsidiary-
subsidiary relationships. 
Recent studies of control within MNCs are not in uniform agreement with regard to 
ability of agency theory to serve as the basis for explanation.  Chang and Taylor (1999) find 
support for agency theory in explaining the control mechanisms implemented over the Korean 
subsidiary units of MNCs.  On the other hand other studies using a wider spread of subsidiary 
locations find that agency theory is limited in its ability to explain decision-making in 
subsidiaries characterized by high levels of strategic independence (e.g., O’Donnell, 2000). 
Indeed, there are recent studies that find no support for agency theory at all.  It has been reported 
that socialization mechanisms help in motivating inter-unit knowledge transfers, while agency 
based mechanisms have no effect (Bjorkman, Barner-Rasmussen, and Li, 2004).  We argue that 
as the diversity of subsidiary roles within the MNC increases, both agency theory and resource 
dependency theory are needed to be able to explain the full variety of inter-unit relationships 
within the firm.  Agency theory is better suited to explaining the relationships of more 
‘traditional’, competence-exploiting subsidiaries, while resource dependency theory does a bette 
job of explaining the relationships of competence-creating subsidiaries. 
  
CONCLUSION 
All in all we propose that agency theory and resource dependency theory provide 
complementary frameworks within which to understand decision-making by managers in MNC 
subsidiaries.  We show that agency theory applies when the subsidiary’s decision rights are 
‘loaned’ by headquarters.  Agency theory is more applicable to the traditional model of MNC 
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where subsidiaries differ in the extent to which they exploit home-base advantages and create 
benefits like profits or cashflow, over which the MNC parent can exercise defensible property 
rights.  The degree of autonomy allowed to subsidiaries is directly related to the benefits that 
they create for the parent MNC.  Headquarters uses hierarchical ‘hard control’ mechanisms to 
curtail the autonomy of subsidiaries creating large benefit streams.  Subsidiaries creating limited 
strategic value may be allowed considerably more autonomy (illustrated in the figure). 
However, as modern MNCs increasingly depend on leveraging their entire networks to 
generate competitive advantage, some subsidiaries have evolved to augment home-base 
advantages.   Such subsidiaries generally create competencies based on the control of intangible 
resources like knowledge assets over which property rights are difficult to define and defend.  
These subsidiaries exercise considerable power within the MNC and ‘own’ their decision rights.  
The MNC parent must design ‘soft control’ mechanisms to promote subsidiary competence 
creation while encouraging integration with the rest of the firm’s network (illustrated in the 
figure).  Resource dependency theory provides a better basis upon which to understand the 
relationships between such subsidiaries and their parent MNCs. 
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FIGURE 
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